Forces Shaping China's Interprovincial Inequality by Tsui, Kai-yuen
 
Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2006 
* Department of Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, email: kaiyuentsui@cuhk.edu.hk  
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on Inequality and Poverty in China. 
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions to its research programme by the 
governments of Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), 
Norway (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency—Sida) and the United Kingdom (Department for International Development). 
ISSN 1810-2611  ISBN 92-9190-912-2 (internet version) 
Research Paper No. 2006/128 





This paper explores the forces that shaped China’s interprovincial inequality in the last 
five decades of communist rule. In so far as the change in interprovincial inequality is 
the result of differential growth in the provincial GDP per capita and provincial 
economic growth may be decomposed into contributions by total factor productivity and 
other factor inputs, a new method is introduced, breaking down the change in inequality 
into contributions by total factor productivity (TFP) and factor inputs. In particular, the 
findings suggest that TFP and factor inputs exerted different impact on interprovincial 
inequality in the Maoist and reform era.  
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The unveiling of the western development programme1 in 1999 by China’s former Party 
Secretary, Jiang Zemin, is a reminder that notwithstanding China’s spectacular 
economic success, the Middle Kingdom is still a country full of stark contrasts, 
conjuring up an image of the western periphery lagging far behind the eastern core. 
Uneven regional development remains a hotly debated issue half a century after 
Chairman Mao declared the contradictions between the coastal and inland provinces as 
one of the so-called ten cardinal relations (shida guanxi) to be addressed. There is by 
now a large literature on China’s interprovincial inequality (Fujita and Hu 2001; Jian, 
Sachs and Warner 1996; Lyons 1991; Naughton 2002; Lin, Cai and Li 1998; Lin and 
Cai 2003; Raiser 1998; Tsui 1991, 1996; Wang and Hu 1999; the list is by no means 
exhaustive). This paper extends previous works along two fronts. First, in view of the 
problems plaguing Chinese official data, this paper tries to address seriously   
the problems with Chinese statistics and comes up with adjusted data for the analysis of 
the trend in interprovincial inequality since the 1950s. Second, and more importantly, 
we introduce a framework for quantitatively identifying the contributions of different 
forces behind the oscillation of interprovincial inequality.  
With regard to the first issue, previous studies rarely treat the problem of China’s data 
seriously, though the quality of the data has recently been the subject of much scrutiny, 
e.g., Rawski (2001); Young (2000); Holz (2004). Recent scepticism with Chinese 
official data coupled with the anomalies we have discovered in provincial statistics has 
prompted us to experiment with different ways of adjusting the official figures to arrive 
at a trend in interprovincial inequality. The results turn out to be somewhat different 
from those in previous studies. 
The present study also fills the lacuna in existing literature by proposing a coherent 
framework not only to identify the forces shaping interprovincial inequality, but also to 
assess their relative importance by quantitatively decomposing China’s interprovincial 
inequality into components. In this connection, a novel method building a bridge 
between growth accounting, often invoked to study the sources of growth, and the 
dynamics of regional inequality is introduced. To be more precise, let I(y) be some 
measure of interprovincial inequality, where y is a vector of provincial GDP per capita. 
In so far as provincial output and factor inputs may be summarized by provincial 
production functions (see Equation 1), the change in interprovincial inequality, 
dt dI / ) (y , may be expressed as a function of provincial growth rates. Employing the 
growth accounting technique, the latter in turn may be decomposed into contributions 
by the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) and such factor inputs as physical and 
human capital.  dt dI / ) (y  may thus be attributable to the changing pattern of 
interprovincial allocation in investment captured by the interprovincial differential 
growth in physical and human capital as well as the impact of institutional innovations 
encapsulated in the growth of TFP.  
To motivate the subsequent empirical exercise, a historical sketch of the forces shaping 
interprovincial inequality is the subject of section 2. Experimenting with different ways 
of adjusting the official data, section 3 arrives at trajectories of interprovincial inequality 
that may be compared with the one based on official data. Section 3 introduces the 
                                                 
1  For background information, see, e.g., Naughton (2004) and Goodman (2004).  
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conceptual framework that is employed to explain the evolution of regional disparities. 
The empirical results based on the conceptual framework and adjusted data are 
summarized in section 4. The concluding section highlights and interprets our salient 
findings and proposes possible extensions of the paper. 
2 Background 
There is a common perception that regional development strategy in the last four 
decades went through a number of phases, inducing different forces that impinged 
ultimately on interprovincial inequalities. This section is a historical synopsis of these 
forces that possibly might have exerted effect on the dynamics of interprovincial 
inequalities. These forces are incorporated in the decomposition exercise in the next 
section. 
In the prereform era, the Chinese government saw it as one of their goals to reduce the 
gap between the coastal and inland provinces, a goal reinforced by defence 
considerations. Lardy (1978) and later Naughton (2002) have pointed out that the 
apparatus of central planning gave the Chinese government a handle to mobilize 
resources for achieving that goal, as witnessed by state appropriations as the dominant 
source of investment funds (see Table 1). However, the spatial allocation of investment 
funds often was not concerned with such efficiency considerations as comparative 
advantages and economies of scale. A case in point is the ‘third front campaign’, which 
was a defence-related programme to relocate industries to inland provinces in the mid 
1960s and the early 1970s (Naughton 1988). With state investments pouring into some 
inland provinces, the campaign is often perceived as an extreme manifestation of such 
an apparently egalitarian development strategy. Such a massive plan to transfer 
industrial capacities to less-developed regions in complete disregard of their 
comparative advantages and their poor infrastructure turned out to be a recipe for 
economic waste. Inefficient regional development policies were reinforced by the need 
for self-reliance and the formation of a cellular economy (Donnithorne 1972) that 
militated against specialization and the emergence of efficient economic structures. The 
effect of increases in investment favouring some inland provinces was thus offset by all 
the other forces that undercut efficiency and productivity.  
Table 1 
Proportion of investment in fixed assets of state-owned units by sources of funds (10,000 yuan) 
  State appropriation Domestic loans  Foreign funds 
Self-raised funds 
and other sources
1953-57 543.48      68.1 
1958-62 956.91      350.09 
1963-65 424.8  3.3    71.35 
1966-70 923.86  13.4    271.83 
1971-75 1,519.28  21.86    735.23 
1976-80 1,831.85  142.4 111.27  1,100.68 
1981-85 1,680.68  932.86 320.43  2,396.5 
1986-90 2,171.19  3,095.28 1,143.29  6,932.95 
1991-95 2,238.46  9,880.6 2,804.89  23,290.6 
1996-2000 5,525.28  17,335.27 3,151 45,892.56 
Source:   NSB (2002).  
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Notwithstanding the political turmoil and radical economic experiments with disastrous 
consequences at times, the spread of basic education to less-developed provinces was a 
legacy of the Maoist period that has prompted some scholars, among them Bramall 
(2000), to argue that the investment in education in the Maoist era undergirds the rapid 
economic growth in the reform era. At the beginning of the reform era, China had a 
population that was more educated than those in countries with comparable levels of 
development. In so far as education boosts productivity, the spread of education may 
increase the productivity of labourforces in poor provinces and may help reduce gaps 
between rich and poor provinces.2 
The reform era has witnessed a policy break with the past. New forces unleashed by the 
economic reform have fundamentally changed the spatial distribution of investment 
funds and induced a spatial restructuring of industries. With the retreat of central 
planning, the state’s role in the allocation of investment has been diminishing in 
importance, as shown in Table 1. Fiscal decentralization has allowed local governments, 
administrative agencies and state-owned enterprises to retain more of the revenue 
generated within their jurisdictions and has opened up more opportunities to boost their 
fiscal intake (e.g., through township and village enterprises). In the case of Guangdong 
and Fujian, their high-powered fiscal contracting system (dabaogan) was the envy of 
other provinces (Wong, Heady and Woo 1995). The result was an explosion of self-
raised funds, the distribution of which is highly skewed in favour of the richer coastal 
provinces.  
Other than inducing a change in the spatial allocation of investment, productivity-
boosting institutional innovations set off by reforms were often localized with spatially 
differentiated effects. For example, the household responsibility system had its origin in 
Anhui and initially spread faster in the poor provinces. Greater reliance on market 
forces channels industries to regions with comparative advantage and economies of 
scale, in contrast to politically-motivated strategies such as the ‘third front’ campaign 
that could be detrimental to economic efficiency. Richer provinces have also benefited 
from a faster pace of market reforms and opening up to the outside world. Guangdong 
and Fujian have been one step ahead of other provinces, attracting preponderant shares 
of foreign direct investment. The ‘special economic zones’ have helped some coastal 
provinces to attract foreign investments that not only increased physical capital for 
production but also introduced technology and management knowhow, boosting 
productivity. Some of the institutional innovations benefited the poor provinces, others 
boosted productivity of the richer provinces, reinforcing the effect of the new spatial 
pattern of investment distribution.  
What emerges from the discussion is that different policy regimes emerging in the last 
four decades unleashed different forces with differential and, at times, opposing impacts 
on interprovincial inequality. Different policy regimes brought about different spatial 
distribution of such factors of production as human and physical capital. This translated 
into different rates of provincial economic growth. Furthermore, development strategies 
and institutional environment have also exerted spatially differential impacts on aggregate 
productivities of the provincial economies. The complex dynamics of interprovincial 
inequality by the different forces do not indicate a pattern of a monotonic change in 
                                                 
2  However, the rapid expansion of basic education raises questions about the quality of prereform 
education.  
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interprovincial inequality over the last four decades. This is indeed the case,  as is shown 
in the next section when we look into the trend of interprovincial inequality. 
3  Interprovincial inequality: the trend 
With the above background in mind and as a prelude to the subsequent decomposition 
analysis, this section turns to the historical trend in China’s interprovincial inequality 
for the period 1952-99.3 But first, an introduction of our notation is in order. The basic 
unit of our analysis is a province.4 Following the Chinese convention, the provinces 
may be partitioned further into three regions: east, central and west.5 The nominal 
provincial GDP of the mth province in the gth region is Ygm. Let the real provincial GDP 
per capita, ygm, be defined as Ygm/(∏gm Pgm), where Pgm is the total population and ∏gm is 
the GDP deflator of the mth province in the gth region.  
Notwithstanding the many studies that have derived the trend in interprovincial 
inequality, there remains a number of nagging problems with respect to official data. It 
is customary to measure interprovincial inequality in terms of real provincial GDP per 
capita, ygm.6 There are at least two potential problems with using such a measure. With 
the release of provincial real growth rates (e.g., see NBS 1997), most studies have used 
the official growth rates for deriving provincial real GDP. However, much has been 
written on the defects of these growth rates, e.g., Keidel (2001); Rawski (2001); Xu 
(1999, 2000); Wu (2001); Young (2000). Though much less is known about the 
accuracy of the growth rates for the Maoist period, there is a common perception that 
official real growth rates for the reform era are overestimated.7 It is also to be noted that 
the provincial implicit deflators derived from the growth rates seem to indicate price 
variability to be larger than one would expect for the Maoist period, known to be largely 
an era of price stability except for a period in the early 1960s after the ‘great leap 
forward’. 
The second data problem is that official population figures used to estimate the per 
capita GDP have become less accurate in the reform era. Post-reform figures based on 
household registration fail to keep track of inward or outward migration. In this paper, 
                                                 
3   The period under study stops at 1999. While it is possible in theory to extend the study using more 
recent data, there are problems with changing definitions, especially for provincial populations after 
2000, which renders some data intertemporally incomparable. 
4   The directly administered municipalities are incorporated into their neighbouring provinces. Hainan 
and Xizang are excluded. Directly administered municipalities, i.e., Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing and 
Chongqing, are merged with their neighbouring provinces. 
5   The former practice was to include Guangxi in the eastern region. We follow the recent practice of 
assigning it to the western region. Formerly classified as a province in the central region, Neimenggu 
has officially been included in the west region after the introduction of the western development 
programme.  
6   Earlier studies such as Lyons (1991) and Tsui (1991) use national income (guomin shouru) figures 
drawn from the socialist national income accounting framework that excludes the service sector. 
7   In the prereform era, inflation was low except for the years surrounding the ‘great leap forward’ in the 
early 1960s.   
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official population data are used for the prereform era, inter-census population figures 
are derived based on the three censuses after 1982 (see Appendix A). 
To estimate the trend in interprovincial inequality, this paper departs from previous 
studies by experimenting with different GDP deflators and estimates of provincial 
population figures. An alternative to using the official real growth rates is to deflate 
expenditure components by their respective price indices collected from other sources, 
an approach suggested by Keidel (2001). Next is a brief summary of how the data are 
adjusted; a detailed explanation is given in Appendix A.8 The different expenditure 
categories to be individually deflated are rural consumption, urban consumption, 
government consumption, capital formation and net exports. For the period since the 
mid 1980s, provincial CPIs, together with their rural and urban counterparts, are 
available for all provinces and are used to deflate the various categories of consumption. 
For the pre-1985 period, we use provincial retail price indices (RPIs) as deflators 
whenever provincial consumer price indices (CPIs) are not available. The next 
component is gross capital formation (ziben xingcheng zhonge). Provincial price indices 
for fixed asset investment are available only for the period from 1992 to 1999. The 
official implicit deflators for gross capital formation are used until1984. Between 1985 
and 1991, deflators based on prices of capital goods released by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) are constructed. Details on deriving the provincial price indices for 
capital formation are given in Appendix A. 
The adjusted data are used to examine how interprovincial inequality changes over time. 
The results are then compared with those based on official data. For this purpose, we 
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context, the provinces are categorized into the eastern, central and western regions so 
that G is equal to 3. Figure 1 reports three set of results. EN1 is based on unadjusted 
official data. EN2 and EN3 are derived using our estimates of provincial GDP deflators 
and population figures as detailed in Appendix A. EN3 is different from EN2 in the 
deflation of capital formation so as to come up with the provincial GDP deflators. While 
EN3 adopts the official implicit deflators for capital formation, we adjust some 
anomalous figures of the official deflators in arriving at EN2. This does not appear to 
make too great a difference. Next, we focus only on EN1 and EN2. A striking feature is 
that the magnitude of EN1 is distinctly higher than those of the other trend. What is 
even more interesting is that the two trajectories diverge in certain subperiods even 
though their overall oscillation patterns share certain salient features. Until 1967 and 
with the exception of the anomalous years of the ‘great leap forward’, EN1 based on 
official data ratchets upwards while EN2 etches downwards. Inequality shoots up in 
1968, which may be due to production disruptions caused by the chaos of the Cultural 
Revolution. During the period between 1968 and the early 1970s, EN2 moves 
                                                 
8  For another approach, see Young (2000).  
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downwards while EN1 is almost stationary. This period coincides with the ‘third front’ 
campaign when investment funds were poured into inland provinces. But by 1973, all 
the trajectories move upward, reaching a peak in 1976. Start of the reform era sets off a 
conspicuous decline in interprovincial inequalities until the mid 1980s for both EN1 and 
EN2. Thereafter, the two trends initially crawl upwards, followed by sharp increases in 
the first half of the 1990s. Unlike the trend for EN2, which remains by and large stable 
from 1995, the trend using official data continues to climb upwards.  This finding seems 
to suggest that the richer provinces underestimate their rates of inflation, thereby 
exaggerating the increase in inequality. 
Is the trend robust with respect to the inequality indices used? The parameter-dependent 
class of generalized entropy (GE) measures reduces to the Theil entropy measure above 
when the parameter a equals zero.9 We repeat the above exercise using the GE   
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Trends in overall interprovincial inequality 



























































Source for Figures 1 and 2: Computed by author from data sources cited in 
Appendix A. 
                                                 
9   See, for example, Shorrocks (1984).  
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measures when a = 1 and 2 for the case that corresponds to EN2. The case when a is 
equal to 2 is the square of the coefficient of variation. The smaller a, the more sensitive 
the measure is to transfers at the bottom of the income distribution (Shorrocks and 
Foster 1987). The three cases are reported in Figure 2. They are normalized to 100 in 
1952. The trend of interprovincial inequality is, by and large, robust to the inequality 
indices used.  
Since much attention has been focused on the income gap between the coastal and 
inland provinces, it is informative to isolate such a gap from overall inequality. The 
class of entropy measures is susceptible to decomposition into within-region and 
between-region inequality, i.e.:10  
I(y) = WG(y) + BG(y), (2) 
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Figures 3 and 4 report the trends in the within-region inequality and between-region 
inequality, respectively, using different deflators, where WGi and BGi correspond to 
ENi, i = 1, 2, 3. Careful scrutiny suggests that the trajectories based on adjusted data 
differ from the one based on official data. Prereform within-region inequality, inequality 
based on adjusted data (i.e., WG2 and WG3) moves downward with spikes in the second 
half of the 1970s. This is to be contrasted with WG1 that seems, despite oscillations, to 
be on an upward trend. For all three cases, WGi, i = 1, 2, 3, decrease and then taper off 
in the reform era.  
With regard to BGi, i =1, 2, 3, the trends based on the adjusted data fluctuate, as 
opposed to an increasing trend based on official data. The jumps around the early 1950s 
and in 1968 capture the policy shocks of those chaotic years. Then the short interlude 
when downward trends are discernible coincides with the ‘third front campaign’. 
Inequality increases thereafter for all three cases, reaching a peak in 1976. The reform 
era introduces a period of mildly declining or almost stationary between-region 
inequality. From the mid 1980s, the between-region inequality for the three trends 
increases slowly at first and then accelerates. The three trajectories, however, diverge in 
the second half of the 1990s, with the trend based on official data still exhibiting a 
distinctly increasing trend while the other two series are much less pronounced- 
What are the forces driving the aggregate trend in interprovincial inequality? The last 
section reviews the different forces which were created by policy-regime switching and 
which have shaped spatial inequalities over the last four decades. The aggregate trend in 
interprovincial inequality is the convergence of all these forces, some having a 
                                                 
10  See Shorrocks (1984).  
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reinforcing effect, others having a counteracting effect. However, simply observing the 
aggregate trend in interprovincial inequality is not enough to understand the underlying 
dynamics when a confluence of factors are at work. What seems missing in previous 
studies, e.g., Lardy (1978); Donnithorne (1972); Naughton (2002); and Tsui (1991, 
1996), is a better tool for isolating the effects of these forces on interprovincial 
inequality. These factors include, for example, the changing spatial distribution of 
physical investment and the spread of basic education. But physical and human capital 
do not exhaust the list of factors that affect interprovincial inequality. As mentioned 
earlier, spatial distribution of resources induced by different institutional arrangements 
may have implications for comparative advantages and economies of agglomeration 
inducing higher or lower productivity at the aggregate level. Institutional changes were 
pertinent to interprovincial inequality not least because many of these changes were 
region-specific. Next, we introduce a framework to examine more precisely the different 































































































































































































































4  The conceptual framework: growth accounting and interprovincial inequality 
This section introduces a framework for the decomposition of changes in interprovincial 
inequality. The discussion in section 2 highlights the links between the spatial 
distribution of factors of production, e.g., physical and human capital, under different 
policy regimes and regional inequality. No less important is the effect of policy shifts on 
productivity. It is convenient to think in terms of provincial production functions: 
Ygm = AgmFgm (Kgm, Hgm), Hgm = SgmLgm  (3) 
where Kgm is the capital stock, Hgm is quality-adjusted labourforce being a product of an 
index of schooling, Sgm and the labourforce, Lgm. Fgm is an increasing function of Kgm 
and Hgm, and Agm is the term capturing the total factor productivity (TFP) of the mth 
province in the gth region. To make our notation less cumbersome, we omit the time 
subscript. For each province, provincial economic growth may then be decomposed into 












































Interprovincial differences in the growth of Agm, Kgm and Hgm result in provincial outputs 
expanding at different pace, contributing ultimately to the change in interprovincial 
inequality. In this connection, it is to be noted that:  
) / ( ) / ( / gm gm gm gm gm gm P P Y Y y y & & & − =  (5) 
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gm Y K F / ) / ( ∂ ∂ = α and  gm gm gm
L
gm Y H F / ) / ( ∂ ∂ = α . Differential growth rates 
in TFP, physical capital, human capital and population result in different growth rates in 
provincial GDP per capita. The change in inequality index I(y) may ultimately be 
decomposed into contributions of Agm, Kgm, Hgm and Pgm. 
To operationalize the above intuition, the first step is to differentiate Equation (1) with 
respect to time: 
∑∑ ∑∑
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11  Throughout this paper,  X X / & refers to the growth rate of the variable X.   
  10




k gk gm gm
gY Y s
11 /. 12 The first term on the right-hand side of 
Equation (7) captures the impact on interprovincial inequality of differential growth 
rates across provinces, while the second term summarizes the impact of changing 
population shares. It is interesting to note that the impact of  gm gm y y / &  on inequality 
hinges on the sign of the term (sgm – fgm). Behind this term is the implicit ethical 
judgement that, with income share of a province, sgm, falling below its population share, 
fgm, transferring more income to that province reduces inequality. The ethical judgement 
is thus analogous to the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle well-known in the literature on 
inequality measurement.13  
Substituting Equation (6) into Equation (7), the change in inequality then depends on 
the growth of TFP and factor inputs, i.e.:  
=
dt



















































































Whenever any of the above components are positive, they contribute to an increase in 
interprovincial inequality. It is natural to interpret CA, CK, CH as the contributions of 
growth in TFP, physical capital and human capital to the change  in interprovincial 
inequality. Capturing the effect of population growth on inequality is the term CP. 
Faster population growth in a poor region, ceteris paribus, results in an increase in 
interprovincial inequality. Finally, CF summarizes the effect of changing population 
shares on inequality. 
An important dimension of interprovincial inequality that has generated a lot of debate 
is the gap between the coastal provinces as opposed to the central and western 
provinces. Indeed, as shown above, hidden behind overall interprovincial inequality 
may be divergent changes in between-region and within-region inequalities. To gain a 
richer picture of interprovincial inequality, the terms in Equation (8) may be further 
decomposed into between- and within-region contributions. Recalling Equation (2), the 
term dWG(y)/dt may in turn be decomposed as in Equation (8): 
                                                 
12  Details for deriving Equation (7), see Appendix B.  
13 An inequality measure satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle if a transfer of a dollar from a richer to a 
poorer person leads, without changing their total income, to a fall in inequality; see, e.g., Sen (1997).  
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WCF WCP WCH WCK WCA
dt
dWG
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ˆ . Similarly, in the case of between-region 
inequality: 
BCF BCP BCH BCK BCA
dt
dBG
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Variables with ‘^’ denote shares or averages with respect to a region. The term 
( gm gm f s ˆ ˆ − ) is the difference between the income share and population share of the 
mth province within the gth region and its interpretation is similar to (sgm  –  fgm) 
discussed above. In the case of the between-region contribution, since 
( ) gm g gm s f s ˆ − = ( ) g gm gm gm f s s s − ˆ / ˆ  and sgm/ gm s ˆ  is in fact the share of income accruing to 
region g, so that ( ) g gm gm f s s − ˆ /  turns out to be the difference between the income share 
and the population share of the gth region.  
Finally, to facilitate our discussion in subsequent sections, it is helpful to derive 
cumulative changes in inequality induced by the different components above. For 
example, in the case of TFP, its cumulative contribution is defined as follows:  
  12
T CCA  = ∑ =
T
T s s CA
0 ,  T WCCA  = ∑ =
T
T s s WCA
0 ,  T BCCA = ∑ =
T
T s s BCA
0 . (11) 
where CCAT, WCCAT and BCCAT are the cumulative contribution by TFP to the change 
in overall, within-region and between-region inequality from T0 up to the period T. 
Cumulative changes with respect to components other than TFP in Equations (8), (9) 
and (10) may be defined accordingly. 
5 Estimation  of  provincial production functions 
As a prelude to the derivation of those components in Equation (8) to Equation (10), the 
provincial production functions have to be estimated. To render the estimation 
manageable, the provincial production functions are assumed to be log-linear. 
Furthermore, to explore the black box of TFP, we assume that A depends on a R-vector 
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It follows that the contribution of TFP may further be decomposed: 
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WCA and BCA may be decomposed analogously. 
With regard to zgm, data availability has limited the factors we can include in zgm. An 
important dimension of China’s reform is the open-door policy as manifested in the 
huge influx of foreign direct investments (FDI). The spatial distribution of FDI is 
skewed towards the coastal provinces not only because of spatially differential policies 
(e.g., all the special economic zones are in the coastal region only), but possibly because 
coastal provinces are farther advanced with regard to reform. Therefore as a proxy for 
openness, we incorporate FDI as a share of GDP into zgm. In recent years, many studies 
have tried to establish the nexus between openness and growth. In the present context, 
we try to determine how differential degrees of openness impact on interprovincial 
inequality via their effect on provincial economic growth.  
Another factor that possibly affects TFP is the spatial reshuffling of industries 
mentioned in section 2. With the retreat of central planning, the spatial flows of 
investments have conformed with comparative advantages and economies of scale. 
Fujita and Hu (2001) argue that industrial agglomeration in the coastal region has 
become stronger in the reform era and may even be a direct source of regional 
inequality. On the other hand, by blocking the free flow of resources between 
jurisdictions, local protectionism may have weakened the effect of agglomeration and 
comparative advantage on regional inequality. How serious market fragmentation is in 
the reform era is still an unsettled issue, see, e.g., Naughton (2002) and Young (2000). 
Empirical evidence seems to suggest that China has yet to fully exploit the effect of 
agglomeration on productivity (Au and Henderson 2004). It is also useful to note that  
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the reorientation of industrial strategy from an excessive focus on heavy industries to 
the judicious exploitation of China’s comparative advantage in labour-intensive 
industries has boosted some provinces, such as Guangdong and Fujian, that were 
lagging behind in the prereform era. This has triggered a decline in such industrial 
powerhouses as Liaoning. In view of these complicated dynamics, without an empirical 
analysis it is a priori difficult to ascertain how industrial restructuring affects regional 
inequality. In the present context, we treat the effect induced by the industrial 
reshuffling as among zgm that may affect productivity. The effect is measured by the 
share of that province’s secondary-sector output to the national total, i.e., Y2k /ΣmY2m, 
where Y2k is the kth province’s output of the secondary sector and the denominator is the 
national total.14 As an illustration, Figure 10 summarizes the shares for Guangdong and 
Liaoning for the period under study. The underlying increase in the share of Guangdong 
since 1978 may expand the productivity of the province due to the exploitation of 
comparative advantage and economies of scale producing for the world market.  
In addition to these two key variables, a dummy variable for the initial years of the 
Cultural Revolution and a time trend for the reform era are also included in zgm.15 The 
included variables do not exhaust all the factors driving TFP growth. However, data 
limitations prevent us from embarking on a more comprehensive investigation. Much 
remains to be done in future work to explore the forces driving TFP.  
6 Empirical  findings 
Before implementing the decomposition exercise, we first estimate Equation (12). We 
briefly summarize how a number of econometric issues are dealt with. Covering the 
period from 1964 to 1999, the provincial data are pooled to increase the degree of 
freedom. First, the panel unit-root test proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) 
suggests that the timeseries for the regression is not stationary.16 To avoid the potential 
problem of spurious correlation based on level data, we estimate the first-difference 
form of Equation (12). To test whether the right-hand side variables are exogenous, we 
apply the Wooldridge (2002) test for strict exogeneity. The test suggests that the bias 
induced by endogeneity of RHS variables is not serious. The above tests and procedures 
result in the two sets of estimates given in Table 2, one for the log-linear case and the 
other for the case of constant returns to scale, i.e., αK + αH = 1. Robust t statistics are 
based on variance-covariance matrices taking into account autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity proposed by Arellano (2003). Finally, using the Wald test for linear 
restrictions, the hypothesis of constant returns to scale is accepted.17  
                                                 
14 In the literature on agglomeration, the regional share of industry is often used as a measure for 
agglomeration, see, e.g., Brakman, Garretsen and van Marrewijk  (2001). 
15   We have also experimented with the share of primary output. The rationale is that TFP growth in 
many developing countries is due to structural transformation. However, in the present context, this 
variable does not seem to be significant.  
16  Results are available on request. 
17 In any case, the magnitudes of the estimates are quite similar. The Wald test is used because of the 
robust variance-covariance matrix.  
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Table 2 Regression results from production function estimation 











































Notes:  K = capital stock; H = quality-adjusted labourforce; FDI = share of foreign direct investment to 
GDP; IND = share of the secondary sector; CRV = dummy for the Cultural Revolution; TD = time 
trend for the reform era; 
  The estimates are based by pooling the provincial data and estimating the first-difference form of 
the log-linear production, i.e., Equation (12). 
  The variance-covariance matrix is robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity following  
Arellano (2003). 
  Figures in parentheses are t statistics. 
The results of the above regressions are summarized in Table 2. Two sets of estimates 
are presented, one for the panel regression without and the other with the constant 
returns-to-scale restriction. As suggested above, the Wald test for linear restrictions 
accepts the hypothesis of constant returns to scale. Estimates for λgmr, αK and αH are 
plugged into the equations for the various contributions to inequality. The contributions 
by the different factors are summarized in Figure 5. CCK and CCHL are the 
contributions of the growth in physical capital and quality-adjusted labour. 
Decomposing the contribution of TFP growth, CCFDI pertains to the contribution of 
openness and CCIND that of spatial industrial restructuring. What remains after 
deducting CCFDI and CCIND is CCOTH. 
Being a dominating factor and the focus of many previous studies (e.g., Naughton 
2002), the cumulative contribution of physical capital (CCK) unambiguously declines 
until 1972 and then starts to climb until the end of period under review. As shown in 
Figure 6, the initial decline is attributable to the fall in both with-region contribution of 
capital (WCCK) and between-region contribution of capital (BCCK), though the 
magnitude of the latter is much larger. The decline in BCCK coincides with the ‘third 
front’ campaign, a period when massive state investments were directed to the inland 
provinces.  
The increasing trajectory of CCK after 1973 is largely explained by the widening gap 
among the coastal, central and western regions, so much so that by the 1990s, the 
upward trend in CCK is entirely propelled by BCCK. The peak of the ‘third front’ 
campaign was over in the 1970s (Naughton 1988, 2002) and the result is captured by 
CCK moving upward again. As shown in Figure 6, the sharp increase in CCK 
progressively driven by the between-region contribution of capital (BCCK) is the major 
force in the reform era pushing interprovincial inequality upwards. The reform brings in  
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a period of investment funds from new sources such as self-raised funds and foreign 
capital, the allocation of which is not in the hands of the central government, (recall 
Table 1). Administrative decentralization has put more extrabudgetary funds at the 
disposal of the state-owned enterprises, administrative agencies and local governments. 
Fiscal devolution has opened up opportunities for local governments to venture into 
profitable businesses such as township and village enterprises, resulting in an explosion 
of self-raised funds. Large shares of these funds have accrued to richer provinces and 
have been targeted to investment projects to fuel local economic development. The 
open-door and the preferential policies granted to the coastal provinces of Guangdong 
and Fujian attracted preponderant shares of FDI into the richer coastal provinces. 
Departing from the egalitarian investment strategy of central planning, the spatial 
distribution of investment funds in the reform era has thus been increasingly skewed in 
favour of richer provinces, explaining the increase in BCCK.  
Even though the above discussion has confirmed that contribution of physical capital is, 
ceter paribus, important in explaining interprovincial inequality, it is interesting to note 
that changes in CCK do not always track the trend in overall interprovincial inequality. 
 
Figure 5 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source for Figures 7, 8, and 9: Computed by author from data sources 
cited in Appendix A.  
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Our results suggest that the cumulative contribution to inequality of TFP growth before 
deducting the impact of FDI and industrial restructuring, i.e., CCA, is equally if not 
more important in certain subperiods and has a trajectory that is divergent from that of 
CCK. Figure 7 summarizes the contribution of TFP (CCA) based on Equation (13). 
During the Cultural Revolution (1967-77), the magnitude of the upward trend in CCA is 
so large that it surpasses CCK so that overall inequality increases. Decomposing CCA 
using Equation (13), and the proxy for the distribution of industries exhibits some spikes 
but no discernible trajectory. CCOTH (equal to CCA-CCFDI-CCIND) in Figure 5 is the 
remainder after the contributions of FDI and IND are deduced and exhibits, by and 
large, an increasing trend up to the mid 1970s.  
Using Equation (13), the effects of FDI and industrial restructuring may be extracted 
from CCA. There was no FDI in the prereform era. FDI initially contributes to an 
increase in inequality but the effect tapers off from the mid 1980s onwards. After a 
jump induced by initial FDI flows into the coastal provinces (such as Guangdong), the 
between-region contribution of FDI (BCCFDI) does not exhibit a discernible trend. The 
trajectory of the within-region contribution (WCCFDI) exhibits a one-off decrease, 
followed by an upward trend. This is consistent with the fact that the initial beneficiaries 
of FDI are the poorer coastal provinces, such as Guangdong and Fujian which constitute 
the special economic zones. Foreign capital subsequently spread to other coastal 
provinces. On the whole, these contributions are relatively small in magnitude.  
Figure 9 summarizes the overall (CCIND), between- (BCCIND) and within-region 
contributions (WCCIND) of industrial restructuring. In the prereform era, there are a 
number of inequality-increasing spikes but no discernible trends are detected. Since the 
late 1970s, CCIND contributes to a reduction in overall interprovincial inequality, 
though its inequality-reducing effect tapers off in the 1990s. In decomposing CCIND 
further into between- and within-region contributions, the declining trend is largely 
attributable to WCCIND and, to a much smaller extent, to BCCIND. In the latter case, 
the trend of BCCIND seems to have become modest in the 1990s. In a further 
breakdown of WCCIND into contributions by the three regions, the decline is 
concentrated largely within the eastern region.18 The reform period has witnessed the 
decline of such industrial powerhouses as Liaoning that relied on heavy industries. In 
their place are new industrial-growth poles such as Guangdong, translating their 
comparative advantage and economies of scale in labour-intensive industries (see 
Figure 10) into faster TFP growth. As these newly industrializing provinces were less 
developed in the initial stages of the reform era, industrial restructuring has thus reduced 
interprovincial inequality. 
Next, as depicted in Figure 11, quality-adjusted labour (H) contributes to an increase in 
interprovincial inequality until the mid 1970s, after which the trend is reversed. The 
trajectories of between-region (BCCHL) and within-region contributions (WCCHL) are 
similar, with the inequality-reducing effect of the between-region contributions being 
more prominent. Two forces are at work. First, growth of the labourforce is faster in 
poor provinces. The second factor is the spread of education. As better-educated 
children in the poor provinces gradually entered the labourforce in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the rapid improvement in labour quality S leads to a faster growth in H. Our empirical 
                                                 
18 Recall (9); the figures are not reported but available on request.  
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findings suggest that this translates into a decline in interprovincial inequality but the 
impact is small relative to the contributions of TFP and physical capital (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 10 








































































































































































Source for Figures 10 and 11: Computed by author from data sources cited 
in Appendix A. 
7  Salient findings and concluding remarks 
The main objective of this paper is to better link the forces induced by policy regime 
switching to the fluctuation in interprovincial inequality. This is done with the help of 
data that have been adjusted to hopefully take into account the data problems that are  
of concern to many experts on China. As our empirical results suggest, the vicissitude of 
interprovincial inequality reflects the paradigm shifts in China’s development strategies 
over the last four decades that reshuffled resources and induced spatially differential 
impacts. The rest of this section highlights three major clusters of results. The first 
pertains to the contribution of capital vis-a-vis TFP growth. Our findings seem to  
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suggest that the different policy environments of the Maoist and of the reform era 
induced differential changes in the spatial distribution of capital and TFP growth, at 
times with opposing effects on interprovincial inequality. The second set of results 
indicates a more complex picture than can be captured by the coastal-inland divide in 
explaining interprovincial inequality. The final set of results sheds light on the effect of 
prereform spread of education on growth in the reform era. 
Regime switching in the mid 1970s leaves a permanent imprint with regard to the 
contribution of physical capital to inequality, with its trajectory reversing from a 
downward to an upward direction. However, the changing locations of investment 
allocation does not fully explain the interprovincial inequality trends. Indeed, the 
contribution of physical capital has a trajectory that, at times, is divergent from that of 
TFP. In the prereform era, especially during the ten-year period of the Cultural 
Revolution, the contribution of TFP growth surpasses that of physical investment, and 
seems to coincide with the shocks induced by political turmoil as well as the policy 
environment in the prereform era. As pointed out by Donnithorne (1972), the ‘cellular 
economy’ induced by a policy of self-reliance militated against the convergence of TFP, 
in so far as the interjurisdictional flow of resources, ranging from factors of production 
to ideas and knowledge, was discouraged. The roles of TFP growth and of investment 
have been reversed since the late 1970s; the decreasing contribution of TFP more than 
offsets the increasing contribution of capital, accounting for the decline in 
interprovincial inequality in the 1980s. The inequality-decreasing contribution of TFP 
fades in the 1990s, with the trajectory of the contribution of capital becoming dominant. 
Spatial industrial restructuring, with the evolution of provincial shares of secondary-
sector output as a proxy, turns out to be important in explaining much of the decline in 
the contribution of TFP in the post-Mao era. Relinquishing the policy of self-reliance, 
industrial decisions have become oriented towards comparative and agglomeration 
advantages. As summarized by our empirical results, industrial reshuffling in the 1980s 
probably had the effect of rectifying a distorted spatial industrial structure and induced a 
decline both in within-region and between-region inequality. This effect is so powerful 
that it overrides the other inequality-increasing forces, leading to an overall decrease in 
interprovincial inequality. Once the spatial restructuring of industries was complete and 
the effect exhausted, our findings seem to suggest that the spatial distribution of TFP 
growth contributes to an increase in between-region inequality in the 1990s. 
Institutional changes seem to be moving at a much faster pace in the coastal provinces, 
probably reinforced by agglomeration economies. 
In so far as the coastal-inland divide is in the limelight and such government initiatives 
as the ‘western development programme’ are an attempt to address the imbalance, 
highlighting some salient findings along this line seems warranted. In this study, 
changes in the overall between-region contribution reported in Figure 4 are decomposed 
into the contributions by TFP, physical capital and human capital (recall Equation 10). 
In the prereform era, the inequality-reducing between-region contribution of capital 
(CCK) is more than offset by the increase in the between-region contribution of TFP. 
Since the mid 1970s, changing spatial patterns of investment are the major factor behind 
the between-region inequality. However, other forces at times counteract this tendency. 
Among these are the investments in education in the prereform period, the effect of 
which began to show up in the late 1970s, and industrial restructuring in the 1980s. 
Their impact, however, is modest in comparison with the contribution of capital. The  
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sharp increase in overall interprovincial inequality in the early 1990s is largely due to 
the increase in between-region contribution of physical capital. 
Nevertheless, there is more to interprovincial inequality than the coastal-inland 
dichotomy. As shown in Figure 3, there is a sustained decline in the within-region 
inequality. Careful scrutiny suggests that the fluctuation of provinces within the coastal 
region can, at times, be the dominant force behind the trajectory of overall 
interprovincial inequality. Worthy of particular mention is the industrial restructuring 
among the coastal provinces that triggers a fall in interprovincial inequality in the 
1980s. The emerging new growth poles in the eastern region have capitalized on the 
development of non-state industrial enterprises (e.g., township and village enterprises) 
and the open-door policy. In sharp contrast is the decline in the old industrial centres 
(especially those in the northeast) as their moribund state-owned enterprises failed to 
meet the competition brought about by market reform. The above transformation 
translates into a decline in overall interprovincial inequality in the 1980s, with the 
within-region contribution of industrial restructuring exhibiting a downward trend. 
Last but not least, the effect of schooling on China’s interprovincial inequality is 
discussed much less, although human capital is often in the limelight in connection with 
economic growth. Notwithstanding the political calamities communism inflicted on the 
people, there is no denying that much had been done before 1978 in spreading education 
to the less developed provinces. Some scholars, e.g., Bramall (2000), have even gone so 
far as to argue that the prereform investment in education laid the foundation for the 
spectacular growth of the reform era. This paper is a preliminary attempt to incorporate 
this issue into the analysis of interprovincial inequalities, though much remains to be 
done to improve the measure of schooling. The empirical results suggest that 
contribution of schooling first increases and then reduces interprovincial inequality. In 
so far as school-aged children in less developed provinces entered the labourforce in the 
1970s only gradually, our interpretation is that the inequality-reducing effect of 
schooling is a consequence of the prereform expansion of basic education. The 
contribution of quality-adjusted labour to growth is, however, small relative to capital 
and TFP. 
This paper attempts to extend the research on China’s regional inequality first by 
resorting to a more careful use of China’s data and then introducing a framework that 
enhances our understanding of the forces behind the changes in the country’s 
interprovincial inequality. In particular, quantitative estimates of the contributions of 
factors affecting inequality are presented. Much, however, remains to be done. The 
experimentation with adjusting official data leaves room for improvement. Nor is our 
method of adjustment the only one conceivable. For example, Young (2000) tackles the 
problem by first coming up with deflators for different sectors of the national economy, 
an approach that may be applied to provincial data. Another potential extension of our 
study is to experiment with different ways to construct provincial indices for human 
capital, a subject too complex to be elaborated in this paper.19 Finally, our study of the 
factors behind TFP growth is crude and tentative. There are certainly other important 
                                                 
19 The Appendix has a discussion on the derivation of provincial average years of schooling. In this 
paper, we have mainly used age-specific data from censuses to estimate the average years of schooling 
of the labourforce for each province. Another way is to integrate census figures with the annual 
enrolment data.  
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variables in the equation. Among them are the effects of interprovincial migration, local 
protectionism and improvement in transportation network, etc. All these extensions may 
be topics for future research.  
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A1 Real  provincial  GDP 
The nominal GDP for the period 1952 to 1998 are from NBS (2001a). Data for 1999 are 
collected from the provincial yearbooks.20 Care has been exercised in ensuring that the 
1999 data are consistent with those of previous years because provincial statistical 
bureaux periodically update the GDP figures. In case of a province update on its GDP 
series, we use the new series (this involves very few cases). Details are available on 
request. 
To deflate the provincial GDP, we experiment with different methods (recall Figure 1). 
Official real growth rates are available in NBS (1997). Provincial yearbooks may be 
used to deflate nominal GDP. However, as pointed earlier, many China experts suspect 
that official data underestimate inflation in the reform period. This paper follows the 
suggestion of Keidel (2001) by deflating the different categories of expenditure by their 
respective price indices. Specifically: 
Ygm = CR,gm + CUgm + CG,gm + CFgm + NXgm 
where the subscript gm refers to the mth province in the gth region, Ygm = GDP CRgm = 
rural consumption, CUgm = urban consumption, CGgm = government consumption, CFgm 
= capital formation and NXgm = net export. The data are from NBS (2001).21 These 
expenditure components can be found in NBS (2001). For the period from the mid 
1980s onwards, provincial rural and urban CPIs are used to deflate CRgm and CUgm, 
respectively, because better alternatives are hard to come by. Provincial CPI indices are 
used to deflate CGgm. For the preceding period, only provincial cost-of-living indices for 
staff and workers are available for deflating CUgm (NBS 2001). We have no choice but 
to resort to provincial retail price indices (RPIs). Theoretically, the biases with this 
expediency are twofold. First, changes in the prices of services are not taken into 
account. Second, RPIs reflect changes in both rural and urban prices. However, casual 
comparisons of RPIs and CPIs for a few provinces when both indices are available seem 
to suggest that their movements are very similar for the prereform period (with the 
possible exception of the years surrounding the ‘great leap forward’). This, in fact, is not 
surprising because the shares of urban and rural expenditures on services might be 
relatively insignificant. In any case, prices were administratively fixed and rarely 
changed.  
Ideally, provincial capital formation should be deflated using price indices for capital 
goods. This is the case when provincial price indices for fixed asset investment are 
available for the period from 1992 to 1999. For the period 1985-91, the price indices for 
                                                 
20 Another source of national income data is from NSB (1997). However, the data cover the period until 
1995.  A crosscheck of our data with this source of data shows that they are approximately the same. 
21 Jiangxi and Guangdong do not have data for the prereform period. However, information is available 
for these provinces on consumption (xiaofei) and accumulation (jilei) under the socialist material 
product system (MPS); see NBS (1987). To derive deflators for these provinces, the best option is to 
deflate consumption and accumulation as defined in the MPS by their respective price indices. The 
national implicit deflator for capital formation is used to deflate accumulation. The implicit deflators 
so derived are then used to deflate the prereform GDP series for these two provinces. Details are 
available on request (NSB 2001a).  
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capital goods recently released by NBS (2001b) are used to estimate the price indices 
for construction (jianzhu anzhuang) and equipment (shebi). Then, we derive an overall 
price index for capital investment by weighting the indices for construction and 
equipment (shebi) by their respective shares in total investment.22 From 1964 to 1984, 
owing to data limitations, two sets of deflators are used for the period until the mid 
1980s. One set involves using official implicit deflators for capital formation without 
adjustments.23 Using the official implicit deflators for gross capital formation, we can 
derive provincial real GDP per capita series that are used to estimate EN3 in Figure 1. 
Another set includes adjusted official implicit deflators for capital formation that takes 
into account data anomalies. Specifically, there are some years when the implicit rates 
of changes in the prices of capital goods are incredibly high even though the prereform 
era is known to be a period of price stability. Our rule of thumb is to replace price 
increase rates exceeding 20 per cent with the national rates for the same year. For the 
years around the ‘great leap forward’ that were affected by high price increases, we 
refrain from such adjustments. The use of these adjusted deflators corresponds to EN2 
in Figure 1.  
Finally, provincial RPIs are used to deflate net exports. 
A2  Real capital stock 
The main difficulty with the estimation of provincial physical capital stock is to derive 
at the initial capital stock for each of the provinces. We follow the procedure proposed 
by Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993). If, as a first approximation, the capital-output ratio is 
constant, then it can easily be shown that Kgm,t-1 = FAgmt/(g+δ), where K is capital stock, 
FAgmt is real fixed asset investment, δ is the depreciation rate and g is the output growth 
rate. We assume that δ = 0.05. To smooth out fluctuations, a three-year average growth 
rate (the three years being 1953, 1954 and 1955), and the corresponding three-year 
average investment level are used to estimate the 1954 capital stock. Then, the capital 
stock figures for 1953 and 1952 can be derived recursively. To arrive at the real 
provincial capital stock series, the perpetual inventory approach is used: 
Kgmt = (1 - δ)Kgm, t-1 + FAgmt. 
To arrive at the real fixed asset investment, the nominal data used are those of capital 
formation in fixed assets (guding zichan xingcheng zonge) from NBS (2001). The same 
method for the deflation of capital formation (see above) is also applied to arrive at 
FAgmt. Since the sample period of our econometric estimation is 1964-99, whatever 
biases are embedded in the initial capital stocks are hopefully ameliorated after twelve 
years. 
                                                 
22 The publication consists of national price indices for specific capital goods classified under 
construction and equipment. For each category, we take the average of the price increases of the 
specific capital goods to arrive at the price indices for construction and equipment, respectively. To 
arrive at the province-specific indices, the two indices are weighted by the respective shares of 
construction and equipment in total fixed asset investment. 
23 Prereform provincial real growth rates are from NBS (1997).  
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Prereform data on fixed-asset capital formation are not available for Guangdong and 
Jiangxi. We use an admittedly crude method to estimate the prereform data utilizing the 
fixed-asset accumulation figures under the socialist material product system from NSB 
(1987). First, ratios of fixed-asset capital formation under the current national 
accounting system (i.e., SNA) and fixed-asset accumulation under MPS are derived for 
the period 1978-85. The averages of these ratios are then applied to the fixed-asset 
accumulation data for the prereform period to arrive at estimates of fixed-asset capital 
formation under SNA. 
A3  Quality-adjusted labourforce  
Quality-adjusted provincial labourforce is the product of the labourforce (congye 
renyuan) multiplied by the average year of schooling. Provincial labourforce statistics 
are found in NSB (1999) and provincial yearbooks. For a few provinces where data are 
missing for a few years, estimates for those years are derived by using linear 
extrapolations. Details are available on request. One problem with the labourforce 
statistics is that workers on leave (xiagang) were included before 1998. The problem of 
xiagang  began in the early 1990s and reached a peak in the late 1990s. Provincial 
xiagang  figures can be obtained from various issues of NBS’s Department of 
Population, Social and Technological Statistics. Xiagang workers were subtracted from 
total labourforce for the post-1994 period based on the assumption that these figures are 
relatively small before 1994. 
To arrive at provincial estimates of years of schooling, we utilize information from the 
1982, 1990 and 2000 censuses on the working-aged population with different levels of 
education, viz., primary (xiaoxue), junior high (chuzhong), senior high (gaozhong) and 
university (daxue). For any period between two censuses, age-specific population for a 
given level of education is projected forward using the survival rate of that age group. 
For example, let x(a, e, T) be the population at age a with the eth level of education 
derived from the population census in year T (e.g., 1982) for a given province (to ease 
exposition, subscripts for provinces are omitted). In theory, the population at age a+1 in 
year T+1 with the eth level of education is: 
x(a+1, e, T+1) = x(a, e, T)× s(a,T) + d(a+1, T+1),  
where s(a,T) is the rate of those surviving in T+1 and d(a+1, T+1) is the volume of net 
migration between T and T+1. Then, the following recursive formula can be used to  
x(a+k, e, T+k) = x(a+k-1, e, T+k-1)× s(a, T+k-1) + d(a+k, t+k),   (A1) 
Survival rates from provincial life tables,  ) ( ˆ a s , can be used to approximate s(a,t).24 
Annual information on age-specific net migration data is, however, hard to obtain. Thus, 
we have made use of the figures from two consecutive censuses to arrive at the total 
volume of net migration for each age group for the intervening period as a whole. Then, 
the total volume of net migration is evenly distributed among the intervening years. To be 
precise, we first assume that d(a+k, t) = d(a) for the period between the census in year T 
                                                 
24   ) ( ˆ a s  is equal to L(a+1)/L(a), where L(a) is the population surviving to age a in a life table.  
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and the next census K year from T. Then, using the recursive formula above, the estimate 
of x(a+K, e, T+K), denoted by  x ˆ  (a+K, e, T+K, d(a)), is an unknown function of d(a). In 
theory, if our assumption that d(a+k, t) is equal to d(a) were correct, then x(a+K, e, t+K) 
=  x ˆ (a+K, e, T+K, d(a)). Since x(a+K, e, t+K) is a figure that may be derived from the 
census in T+K, we can solve the equation for some implicit net migration figure  ) ( ˆ a d , 
which can be substituted into (A1) to arrive at estimates of x(a+k, e, t+k) between the two 
censuses: 
x ˆ (a+k, e, t+k) = x(a, e, t) × ) ( ˆ a s  + ) ( ˆ a d . 
The above method is used to arrive at the estimates for different education levels for the 
period after 1982 making use of data from the 1982, 1990 and 2000 censuses. The 
number of years of schooling for the working-aged population is then equal to: 
X ˆ  (t+k) =  ) , , ( ˆ
60
15 k t e k a x w
ea e + + ∑ ∑ = , k = 0,1,…,K, (A2) 
where we is the number of years of schooling for the eth level of education. The years 
for primary, junior high, senior high and university education are 6, 9, 12 and 16, 
respectively. 
For the period before 1982, age-specific data required for implementing the above 
method are not available.25 To arrive at estimates before 1982, x(a, e, t) may, in theory, 
be projected recursively backward, i.e.: 
x ˆ (a-k, e, 1982-k)  
= [x ˆ (a-k+1, 1982-k+1) – d(a-k+1, 1982-k+1)]/s ˆ(a-k) 
= f(a,e, k, 1982) – g (a,k) 
where 
f(a,e, k, 1982) = x(a, e, 1982)/(∏ = −
k
j j a s
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f(a,e, k, 1982) may be derived using the 1982 census data and survival rates from life 
tables. The figures for each level of education are then multiplied by their respective 
years of schooling, we, to arrive at the total years of schooling before deducting the 
second term, i.e., F(k,1982) = ∑ ∑ = ea e k e a f w
60
15 ) 1982 , , , ( . 
However, information again on d(a) is not available. There are only provincial figures 
on the total volume of net migration, denoted by m(t), each year. We apply a rule to 
apportion the total to different levels of education. First, we decompose net migration in 
year t, m(t), into different education levels. We assume that the share of net migration 
with working ages is equal to the share of the labourforce of the population of the 
                                                 
25 The census prior to 1982 was undertaken in 1964. However, age-specific figures by education levels 
are not available.  
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province in question, denoted by r(t). Next, we assume that the share of migrants with 
the eth level of education is the same as that of the share of f(a,e, k, 1982) in the 
workforce, denoted by se. Then, r(t)m(t)se is the component of m(t) with the eth level of 
education. Finally the total number of years of schooling with respect to net migration is 
∑e e e s t m t r w ) ( ) ( . This term is then subtracted from F(k,1982) to arrive at the total 
number of years of schooling  ) 1982 ( ˆ k X − . This method is applied to recover the total 
number of years of schooling only up to 1964. One reason is that the ‘great leap 
forward’ had a great impact on population figures and large margins of errors may result 
if  ) ( ˆ t X  is projected back into the 1950s. Second, frequent changes in provincial 
boundaries and large-scale population migration in the 1950s may further reduce the 
accuracy of the estimation.  
There are, no doubt, weak spots in constructing  ) ( ˆ t X , t = 1964, …, 1999, using the 
method delineated above. However, given the data available, this is the best we can do. 
There is much room for further fine-tuning of the method and experimenting with other 
methods (e.g., using enrolment data). To arrive at the average years of schooling S, 
) ( ˆ t X  is divided by the working-aged population (estimated based on census data) 
A4 Population 
Population data used to derive provincial GDP per capita, especially figures based on 
household registration in the reform era, are not without problems because of the failure 
to take proper account of inward or outward migration. In so far as the data problems 
created by migration are not so serious for the prereform period, the official population 
figures from NBS (1999) and from provincial yearbooks are used. From 1982 onwards, 
we extrapolate population figures made up of age-specific data from the 1982, 1990 and 
2000 population censuses. Essentially, we have age-specific populations for all the 
provinces from the 1982, 1990 and 2000 censuses. Using the survival rates from the 
provincial life tables, we project the age-specific population groups forward from one 
census to the next. The difference between the projected and actual figures of the next 
census is assumed to be due to net migration. Such differences are allocated evenly to 
the inter-census years as in the case of schooling.26 
                                                 
26 Details available on request.  
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Appendix B 
This appendix illustrates how the equations in the text are derived. The population-
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P being the total population. It follows that the term is equal the share of GDP accruing 
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Thus, Equation (B2) becomes: 
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Regrouping the terms: 

























































































dI/dt may easily be rewritten as Equation (7) in the text. 
The within-region component is 
WG(y) =  ) ( ∑
G
g g gI f y , fg = ∑
g M
m gm f  
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where the notation is the same as in the text. Thus, 
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Again, using (B4) and (B5), the above expression is reduced to Equation (9). 
The between-region component is: 
BG(y) = ∑ −
G
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where the notation as the same as in the text. Using (B4) and (B5), the above expression 
is reduced to Equation 10. 